I. Introduction
In Flatland, Edwin Abbot's classic account of life in a two-dimensional world, the 1 protagonist, A Square, is granted the wisdom of the third dimension when a sphere appears and lifts him into space. Having seen his world from above, he can never again accept what are regarded as obvious truths by the intelligentsia of his world.
I have had a similar experience. After years of teaching business ethics, I was shown a new normative dimension when I began teaching courses in white collar criminal law. Having seen the world of business from the legal perspective, I can no longer accept what is regarded as the proper method of analyzing normative issues by the mainstream business ethics community. Like A Square, who attempted to bring the perspective of the third dimension to Flatland, I hope to bring the perspective of the federal criminal law to the world of business ethics. That, at least, is the purpose of this article.
In business ethics circles, the present period is quickly becoming known as the post-Enron era. The corporate scandals of the past few years and the resulting criminal prosecution of highranking corporate executives have brought renewed attention to the problem of curtailing dishonest and fraudulent business practices. Indeed, this is a topic on which strategic, ethical, and law enforcement interests appear to be aligned. Good management requires the elimination of 2 fraudulent practices that can damage the firm's reputation and subject it to costly civil and criminal liability. Ethical management similarly requires the suppression of dishonest practices that contravene fundamental normative principles and otherwise lack integrity. And effective law enforcement requires successful prosecution and deterrence of conduct that violates federal statutes aimed at suppressing white collar crime.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. It is an unfortunate and largely unremarked fact that several features of federal criminal law and federal law enforcement policy have driven a wedge into this alignment. The civil libertarian features inherent in American criminal law make it exceedingly difficult to successfully prosecute those who commit white collar crimes. Congress and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have responded to this difficulty with statutes and policies that greatly facilitate the efforts of prosecutors. These statutes and policies have significantly 2 altered the conditions under which firms must operate-frequently in ways that do not correspond to principled ethical behavior. Managers are now often forced to choose between their ethical obligations to stakeholders and their obligation to obey the law or aid law enforcement. As a result, current federal law and law enforcement policy are driving up the financial costs firms must incur to meet their ethical obligations both in advance of, and especially after, becoming the subject of a federal criminal investigation.
In this article, I propose to examine the nature and implications of the growing divergence between managers' ethical and legal obligations. I begin by describing the traditional approach to business ethics analysis. I then identify the features of federal criminal law and law enforcement For purposes of concision, I speak exclusively in terms of for-profit enterprises. However, my point is 3 general. Non-profits must still use resources as efficiently as possible in order to best achieve their goals. Charitable organizations that dissipate their resources while only poorly serving the ends of their donors will soon find themselves without donors. Although such organizations are not maximizing profits, their managers are still bound to strive to accomplish their organizations' missions at the lowest possible cost. 3 policy that are responsible for the divergence, and show how they are undermining the efficacy of the traditional approach. I illustrate this effect with the issue of workplace confidentiality. I then argue that the traditional approach must be reformed to give explicit recognition to the legal dimension of normative analysis, and demonstrate how such a reformed approach would function by applying it to three illustrative issues-organizational justice, privacy, and ethical auditing-and supplying a case study-KPMG's allegedly abusive tax shelters. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the prospects of my proposal gaining acceptance.
II. A Flaw in the Traditional Approach to Business Ethics
Because businesses function in a competitive market environment, their survival is always at stake. A firm that uses resources so wastefully that its revenue cannot cover its costs will go bankrupt and disappear from the market. But even a firm that uses resources relatively efficiently will fail if its competitors are so much more efficient that they can sell their goods or services at a price the firm cannot profitably match. Hence, managers face a market imperative to reduce their costs relative to output to the greatest extent possible-that is, to maximize profits. 3 Within the range of actions that will increase a firm's profits, there will be many that are not normatively acceptable. Burning down a competitor's plant, for example, may well increase a firm's profits, but is obviously outside the realm of normatively permissible action. Legal restrictions and ethical principles limit the range of actions managers may take in pursuit of profit.
The traditional approach to business ethics views managers as confronted with twin
See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 4 Sept. 13, 1970 . Note that Friedman's version of the stockholder theory is not that referred to in the text. Friedman does not assert that the only restrictions on the pursuit of profit are those embodied in law. He explicitly recognizes the additional normative obligations to refrain from rent-seeking and deceptive practices, i. REV. 252, 254-71 (1994) .
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE 6 BEHAVIOR 111-112 (1975) ; Norman E. Bowie, Fair Markets, 7 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 89 (1988) ; THOMAS DONALDSON &THOMAS DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND 156-160 (1999) . 4 imperatives-the strategic market imperative to increase profits and the normative legal/ethical imperative to utilize only appropriate means to do so. The competing theories of business ethics are seen as specifying the extent to which the normative imperative curtails pursuit of the strategic one. For example, an extreme adherent of the stockholder theory may argue that the only normative restrictions on the pursuit of profit are those embodied in law, while an adherent of 4 integrative social contracts theory may argue that managers' actions are circumscribed not only by law, but by hypernorms and microsocial contracts as well. This approach assumes that law and 5 ethics always pull in the same direction, and, by doing so, reduces the essential challenge of business ethics to determining the point at which the normative demands override the strategic ones.
The traditional approach reflects the long-established convention within business ethics literature of viewing the legal and ethical imperatives as aligned. In this tradition, the law is viewed as embodying only a minimal set of normative requirements designed to eliminate the most harmful forms of behavior-a set which in itself cannot provide an adequate prescription for ethical business practice. Such a prescription requires that the law be supplemented by extra-legal, ethical obligations. Thus, although business ethics literature traditionally views the law as providing 6 merely a subset of managers' normative obligations, it nevertheless views the obligations imposed by law as consistent with those imposed by ethics.
Unfortunately, this tradition suffers from two serious defects. The first is that it rests on the false assumption that the criminal law prohibits only morally blameworthy behavior. The second is that it ignores the practical effects of the legal standard for corporate criminal responsibility and contemporary federal law enforcement policy. Due to these features of federal criminal law, there is a large and increasing number of cases in which the legal and ethical imperatives are not aligned-in which the law and ethics impose conflicting demands on managers.
In these situations, the traditional approach to business ethics not only provides little practical guidance, but also obscures many highly significant normative issues. Thus, the growing divergence between the legal and ethical imperatives indicate that the traditional approach to business ethics needs supplementation.
III. The Source of the Divergence
The assumption underlying the traditional approach to business ethics is that ethics and the law are consistent. Under this assumption, it is always possible to simultaneously comply with the law and meet one's ethical obligations. If the law was merely a subset of ethics-if the law commanded only ethically appropriate actions-this assumption would be unobjectionable.
Unfortunately, in the contemporary business environment, the assumption is unfounded. Today, the law frequently imposes legal duties or creates financial incentives that conflict with managers' ethical obligations.
The source of the divergence between managers' legal and ethical obligations can be traced to two sources: the recent expansion of federal criminal law and the practical necessities of 
A. The Expansion of Federal Criminal Law
Over the course of several decades, Congress has vastly expanded the scope of federal criminal law. It has done so by 1) enacting extremely wide-ranging anti-fraud legislation, 2) creating a myriad of new regulatory "public welfare" offenses, and 3) outlawing actions which, although innocent in themselves, make it more difficult for the government to prosecute other substantive offenses.
Federal Anti-Fraud Legislation
Recently, Congress has passed a sweeping array of anti-fraud legislation that criminalizes 7 virtually all forms of dishonest business practices. The federal fraud statutes outlaw not only completed frauds, but participation in "any scheme or artifice to defraud." These offenses do not 8 require proof that the scheme was designed to obtain the property of another because Congress has defined a scheme or artifice to defraud to include "a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." They also require no proof that the defendant actually 9 obtained the property of the victim or deprived the victim of the intangible right of honest services or that the victim relied on any representation of the defendant because " [b] y prohibiting the 'scheme to defraud,' rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would require no proof that there was a misrepresentation of fact because it is just as unlawful to speak 'half truths' or to omit to state facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The statements need not be false or fraudulent on their face, and the accused need not misrepresent any fact, since all that is necessary is that the scheme be reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.
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The reach of the federal fraud statutes is so great as to be, in the words of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, "virtually limitless." Federal fraud charges have been brought against a 12 developer who claimed its homes were good investments, a physician who failed to disclose to 13 his patients that he received a fee for referring them to a hospital, a Senator's brother for 14 secretly lobbying him on behalf of a corporation, and an employee of the IRS for looking at 15 confidential tax returns in contravention of IRS policy. The breadth of these statutes is perhaps 16 best illustrated by the recent prosecution of Martha Stewart for securities fraud. The government charged Stewart with fraud for publicly, and in the opinion of the government, falsely declaring her innocence of trading stocks on non-public information in an effort to "stop or at least slow the steady erosion of MSLO's [Martha Steward Living Omnimedia, Inc.] broad and the border between legal and illegal conduct so indistinct that it is entirely possible to commit a fraud offense with no awareness that one is doing so.
Regulatory Offenses
Traditionally, criminal law required intentional or reckless conduct for one to be convicted of an offense. This changed as Congress created a myriad of regulatory "public welfare offenses"-criminal offenses that can be committed innocently or inadvertently. Public welfare offenses may require a showing that one has acted negligently, i.e., that one has failed to exercise the degree of care that a reasonable person would exercise, but they frequently require no 18 culpable state of mind, or mens rea, at all. In the latter case, one can be guilty of a criminal offense even though he or she has used his or her best efforts to obey the law. Thus, a company that ran a tank farm near Boston Harbor was convicted of violating the Refuse Act for allowing 19 oil to seep into a part of Boston Harbor even though the government made no allegation of a lack of care by the company and the company "immediately undertook to clean up the oil and to trace its source . . . [and] worked diligently to divert or drain the accumulation." 20 In addition, under the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine, any person that has "authority to exercise control" over one who commits a public welfare offense may be charged United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 , 1025 (9 Cir. 1998 backhoe operator on his crew negligently pierced an oil pipeline, causing a discharge of oil into a nearby river.
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As these examples illustrate, there is no requirement that one engage in morally blameworthy conduct to be convicted of a criminal offense.
"Secondary" Offenses
Traditionally, criminal offenses consisted of actions that either directly harmed or violated the rights of others or were immoral in themselves. Recently, however, Congress has created a wide array of "secondary" offenses-offenses that consist of actions that are innocent in themselves, but that make it more difficult for the government to prosecute other offenses.
Currency reporting offenses consist in the failure of financial institutions and other covered businesses to report transactions involving more than $10,000 to the federal government.
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See 18 U.S.C. § § 1956, 1957 (2005) ; United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7 Cir. 1991) (in which th 26 the court upheld the money laundering conviction of an alleged drug dealer for writing checks to purchase cell phones and pay his rent and for cashing checks for small amounts at his local bank).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2005) . The reach of §1001 is so broad that it makes it a new federal offense to 27 falsely deny one's guilt of another substantive offense, Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S. 398 (1998) .
See 18 U.S.C. § §1503, 1505, 1510, 1512, 1519-20 (2005) reasonably be foreseen to impede a federal investigation, which ranges from destroying, altering, or concealing documents to persuading others not to cooperate with federal investigators or to assert their Fifth Amendment rights. There is no requirement that one be aware that he or she is 28 violating the law to be convicted of these offenses.
B. The Practical Necessities of Law Enforcement
It is extremely difficult to enforce the expanded federal code within the confines of American criminal law. The federal fraud offenses are directed against the type of deceptive behavior that is intentionally designed to be indistinguishable from non-criminal activity. As a result, considerable investigation may be required merely to establish that a crime has been committed, and even then, a great deal of legal and accounting sophistication may be required to unravel the deception. Proving such an offense beyond reasonable doubt can therefore be an arduous and expensive task. Furthermore, because such behavior often occurs within corporations in which decision-making responsibility is diffused among many parties, it can be exceedingly For a more detailed account of the difficulties of enforcing federal anti-fraud legislation, see Hasnas, 29 supra note 2 at 588-95 (2005) . 11 difficult to prove that any individual acted with the level of intentionality required by the fraud statutes. In addition, the evidence necessary for a conviction, which will predominately consist in the business records of the individual or firm under suspicion, will frequently be protected by the individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or the firm's attorney-client privilege, and hence be unavailable to the government. And although there is no need to prove 29 that a defendant acted intentionally to obtain a conviction for a public welfare offense, such offenses are so numerous, and frequently so technical and arcane, that no police agency could have a budget large enough to enforce them in a country as populous as the United States.
These difficulties made it apparent that the growing body of federal criminal law could not be effectively enforced without the active cooperation of the corporations themselves.
Consequently, Congress, the federal judiciary, and DOJ responded with innovations that either required or provided incentives for such cooperation. The most important of these innovations were the advent of an especially strict form of corporate criminal responsibility, the creation of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and the Thompson Memorandum.
Corporate Criminal Liability
What does it mean to say that a corporation committed a crime? Because a corporation is an abstract entity with no mind in which to form intentions, no heart in which to conceive a guilty will, and no body that can perform prohibited actions, it can be guilty of a criminal offense only if it is held vicariously liable for the actions of at least some of the individuals who comprise it.
Ethicists have offered many theories of corporate responsibility designed to identify the conditions offense even though no individual employee is aware that an offense is being committed.
In sum, a corporation is guilty of a criminal offense whenever it fails to prevent any of its employees from committing an offense as individuals and whenever an offense is committed as a 13 result of the ill-informed or poorly-coordinated actions of its employees as a group. This is so regardless of any considerations of the corporation's ethical "character." Even a corporation that uses its best efforts to abide by the law is liable if a rogue employee commits a crime or if two or more partially informed employees inadvertently take actions that constitute an offense. This standard of corporate criminal responsibility virtually conscripts corporations into becoming deputy law enforcement agents because the only way for them to avoid liability is to monitor the behavior of their employees adequately to ensure that none of them violates the law either individually or through inadvertent collective action.
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and The Thompson Memorandum
Firms cannot be imprisoned, only fined. The standard for determining the amount of financial penalty a corporation receives upon conviction of a federal offense is provided by the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines fix a corporation's punishment by multiplying a "base fine,"-an amount ranging from $5000 to $72,500,000 that is assigned in proportion to the severity of the offense-by a number between .05 and 4.00 that is derived from the corporation's "culpability score"-a figure designed to measure the quality of a firm's corporate character. The culpability score can range from zero to ten and is determined by Id. at § 8C2.6.
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Id. and fully cooperate with the government's investigation, it could reduce its culpability score to zero, which would result in a fine range of from $865,000 to $3.46 million.
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As this illustration makes apparent, achieving the culpability score reductions for having an effective compliance program and for cooperation can be crucially important to corporations' instructs federal prosecutors to base their decision whether to indict a corporation in part on "the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents" and the "adequacy of the corporation's compliance program."
Under the Thompson Memorandum, a corporation's cooperation may depend on its willingness to waive attorney-client privilege, to refrain from advancing its employees' legal fees, and to refuse to enter into joint defense agreements with its employees; and the adequacy of its compliance To facilitate the flow of information about potentially unethical or illegal practices through the corporation, managers must supply employees with a confidential avenue of communication.
Employees will often be unwilling to reveal information when they believe they will suffer adverse consequences if it becomes known they have done so. This is especially true with regard to information indicating that they, their colleagues, or their superiors are involved in unethical or illegal behavior. Thus, only by promising confidentiality can managers guarantee that they will receive the information necessary for them to run their corporations not only efficiently, but ethically and legally as well. When a corporation promises to keep information confidential, it assumes an ethical obligation to do so. The principle involved is the basic ethical obligation to keep one's word. If one party reveals information to a second only because the latter promises to keep the information confidential, the promise ethically binds the second party to do so. This is equally true when the second party is a corporation that is promising confidentiality to its employees. To obtain information under a promise of confidentiality and then disclose it under circumstances not agreed to by the confiding party is essentially to obtain the information by means of a false promise on which the confiding party relied in revealing the information. Such action is ethically indistinguishable from fraud.
Now consider the effect of the incentives created by federal criminal law and DOJ policy.
The combination of corporations' strict liability for the offenses of their employees and the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12 (2005).
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The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this fact in the context of the attorney-client privilege, 55 stating "if the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) . This places corporate managers in an extremely difficult situation. To generate the information necessary to maintain an ethical workplace and ensure that the corporation's employees are complying with the law, management must promise its employees confidentiality.
But to avoid subjecting the corporation to indictment and large monetary fines, management must breach that promise whenever it uncovers potentially illegal activity.
Furthermore, management cannot avoid the dilemma by making only a conditional promise to keep information confidential unless disclosure is necessary for the corporation to cooperate with the government. Such a promise would be patently self-defeating since it is tantamount to saying that the corporation will keep the information confidential unless it is in the corporation's interest to disclose it to investigators. This type of promise is obviously of limited value and will elicit little or no useful information from the corporation's employees that would not otherwise be forthcoming. 
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But even a corporation that decided not to promise any confidentiality for employees' communications could not escape the dilemma. By refusing on ethical grounds to make a promise of confidentiality that it knows it will not keep, such a corporation could decide to conduct its business without the information that such a promise would generate. But in doing so, it would be willingly foregoing one of the most effective means of detecting and preventing violations of law by its employees-a decision which would, under DOJ policy and the Guidelines, subject the corporation to an increased risk of indictment and cost it the three point reduction in culpability score for having an effective compliance program. One of the requirements for such a program is that the corporation "have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization's employees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation." But 56 since whistleblowers are usually subject to retaliation if their identity is known, such a reporting system not merely "may," but virtually must be one that promises confidentiality. Thus, even the 57 decision not to make a promise of confidentiality would significantly increase a corporation's potential liability. In sum, federal criminal law and DOJ policy bring intense pressure to bear on corporations to both make and breach promises of confidentiality. This is a difficult question, and like those above, it is one for which the injunction supplied by the traditional approach to business ethics to pursue profit in conformity with one's legal and ethical obligations provides no useful guidance. It is, in fact, one that the traditional approach with its assumption that law and ethics are consistent typically overlooks. As useful as the traditional approach is for cases in which the law and ethics are congruent, it is simply not equipped to address the ever-increasing range of cases in which they are not.
VI. Up From Flatland: Adding a Dimension to Business Ethics Analysis
In Flatland, A Square treats the monarch of Lineland with disdain for his obtuseness in failing to understand that he can move sideways through the second dimension. He is later embarrassed to learn that he has been similarly obtuse about the third dimension when the sphere lifts him into space. Stone Fund is a large mutual fund company. The majority of investors in the Stone Fund are small investors, but the fund has several large investors as well as several institutional investors. Until recently, Gordon Gekko was one of the fund's most successful manager/brokers. He was responsible for acquiring most of the large investors in the fund. He apparently did this by allowing several of these investors to make trades after 4:00 p.m., which is illegal. Budd Fox, a junior broker who worked for Gekko, processed many of the late trades. Fox, who had been hired right out of business school, was not at first aware that he was doing anything wrong. Gekko's high status in the company, his forceful personality, and his assurance that the late trades were perfectly acceptable and were standard operating procedure in the industry led Fox to carry out Gekko's orders without qualm. There may be considerable controversy over the exact contours of the principles of organizational justice. But whatever these principles consist of, attempting to apply them without considering the legal dimension of the situation can only result in idle speculation akin to that How much more would this be the case if the employee had innocently or inadvertently committed a 69 public welfare offense or was charged as a responsible corporate officer? 28 apocryphally ascribed to the scholastics who debated how many angels could dance on the point of a needle.
In the hypothetical, both Gekko and Fox were acting within the scope of their employment for the benefit of the corporation when they violated the law. Hence, under the legal standard of 67 corporate criminal responsibility, Stone Fund is guilty of all of their offenses. Under the Thompson Memorandum and Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, the corporation can hope to avoid indictment and reduce its potential fine only by cooperating with the government and demonstrating that it has an effective compliance program-that is, only by firing or otherwise sanctioning Fox, refusing to help him defray his legal expenses or prepare his defense, and disclosing to the government all information in its possession that may incriminate him.
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The principles of organizational justice may suggest that Stone Fund is ethically obligated to retain Fox, or to help him defend himself or rehabilitate his career, or to place him under an ethical mentor, or to maintain the confidentiality of his communications. But the law imposes 69 large costs on the corporation for taking such actions. It may be the case that when the demands of both ethics and the law are fully considered, justice requires that Stone Fund accept potential indictment and increased financial liability in order to honor its obligation to Fox. But it is also reasonable to believe that, given that indictment alone can destroy a financial services corporation (think Arthur Andersen), Stone Fund's obligation to protect its other stakeholders may override its obligation to Fox. Whatever the outcome, however, it is clear that no proper ethical analysis can ignore the legal dimension of the problem.
An impressive body of empirical research suggests that corporations can reduce the level of illegal and unethical behavior among their employees more effectively by adopting a "selfregulatory" rather than a "command-and-control" approach to doing so. The former consists of 70 attempting to align employees' personal values with adherence to corporate rules and policies by instituting and adhering to programs of procedural justice. The latter consists of attempting to control employee behavior through the threat of punishment for misbehavior. Apparently, 71 treating employees fairly is a better way of generating legal compliance than threatening to punish them for noncompliance. Empirical evidence further suggests that the two approaches cannot be used concurrently because the use of extrinsic punishment and rewards by the command-andcontrol approach undermines the intrinsic motivation necessary to the self-regulatory approach.
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Consequently, business ethicists frequently advocate that corporations adopt programs of procedural justice in preference to a regime of sanctions.
This can appear to be a good idea, as long as one ignores the legal dimension of ethical analysis. Programs of procedural justice require the corporation to repose significant amounts of trust in employees, rigorously honor commitments it makes to them, and provide them a modicum
To be regarded as cooperating, a corporation must demonstrate "affirmative acceptance of responsibility 73 for its criminal conduct," U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (1) (2005) . Because a corporation that "puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of its guilt" is regarded as not having accepted responsibility for its conduct, Id. at § 8C2.5 cmt. 13, cooperation requires a corporation to be willing to plead guilty. But a corporation is guilty of an offense only when its employees are. Therefore, cooperation requires a corporation to presume its employees are guilty. Hence, no corporation that accords its employees a presumption of innocence can satisfy the legal requirements for cooperation.
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of due process. The latter requires, at least, that the corporation not take adverse action against employees in the absence of adequate evidence of wrongdoing, i.e., that it recognize an organizational "presumption of innocence." But under the Thompson Memorandum and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, adopting such a program would mean that the corporation could never have an effective compliance program and could never fully cooperate with the government. No compliance program that does not incorporate sanctions will be legally regarded as effective, and affording employees a presumption of innocence and honoring promises of confidentiality makes it impossible for the corporation to become the active prosecutorial agent that is required for it to be regarded as fully cooperating.
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It may well be that adopting a program of procedural justice will produce a greater reduction in the criminal violations by a corporation's employees than will instituting a regime of sanctions. But this is not necessarily beneficial if every violation that occurs carries a heightened risk of corporate indictment and considerably larger fines upon conviction. Matters of organizational justice simply cannot be usefully analyzed without explicitly considering the legal ramifications of the proposed courses of action.
B. Privacy
Corporations can reap strategic benefits from gathering personal information about their employees and monitoring their employees' behavior both on and off the job. Information about employees' health habits can help firms lower their health care outlays and reduce absenteeism.
Information about employees' moral, political, and religious beliefs can help them avoid internal Ethical audits are not without costs, but under the traditional approach, these costs are seen as limited to the reduction in profits attributable to the financial outlay required to perform them. Ethicists frequently argue, however, that these costs are more than offset by the savings corporations realize from the reduction in unethical and illegal workplace behavior that the audits produce, e.g., a more harmonious and committed workforce, reduced exposure to liability, etc.
Yet, even if this were not the case, a cogent argument can be made that because the purpose of the ethical imperative is to limit the strategic one and because ethical audits help corporations and managers more effectively comply with the ethical imperative, the costs of the audits are ones that corporations are obligated to bear. Thus, under the traditional approach, managers appear to have a clear duty to undertake ethical audits. In the current legal environment, ethical audits do more than merely provide managers with information they need to meet their ethical and legal obligations. If they discover anything suggestive of criminal activity, they also turn corporations into deputy prosecutorial agents and greatly increase the corporation's exposure to civil liability. These additional consequences, which are overlooked by the traditional approach, significantly increase the potential costs of undertaking ethical audits. Indeed, a survey of major U.S. corporations undertaken by the Center for Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California suggests that corporate selfassessments are underutilized because corporate directors "are worried that any record of selfcriticism might come back to haunt them in a shareholder suit or a government investigation" and "are fearful that [damaging] statements will show up in court proceedings (or be leaked to the press by plaintiffs' attorneys)."
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There is a good argument that because ethical audits are effective means of improving a corporation's ethical environment, managers are obligated to undertake them despite the legal risks they entail. But there is also a reasonable argument that because ethical audits not only increase the risk of corporate criminal and civil liability, but also trigger a legal duty for the corporation to aid in the prosecution of its employees in ways that may be inconsistent with the principles of organizational justice, the financial and ethical costs they impose are too great for them to be undertaken. Once again, however, we cannot even begin to make a proper evaluation of the issue unless its legal dimension is considered. 
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have information relevant to the investigation and to use its best efforts to induce its present and former partners and employees to provide information and testimony to the government. It refused to advance the legal fees of any partner or employee who refused to cooperate with federal investigators. It refused to enter into any joint defense agreements with any of its present or former partners or employees. It agreed to inform the government which documents its partners and employees were requesting to prepare their defenses. It refused to inform its partners and employees of the documents it is supplying to the government to aid in their prosecution. It placed on leave, reassigned, or forced the resignation of many of its tax partners, including Mr.
Eischeid. It officially stated that a number of its tax partners engaged in unlawful fraudulent conduct and agreed not to make any statement, in litigation or otherwise, that is inconsistent with that assertion or to retain any employee who makes such a statement.
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In return for these and other concessions and for the payment of $456 million, the Department of Justice agreed not to indict KPMG. At the time of this writing, the government has indicted seventeen former partners or employees of KPMG, including Mr. Eischeid.
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How would this case be analyzed under the traditional approach to business ethics? If the management of KPMG knew that all of its partners and employees under federal investigation fraudulently sold what they knew to be illegal tax shelters, then its conduct might be ethically
appropriate. Yet, the illegality of the shelters has never been established, and prior to the criminal investigation, KPMG publicly argued before Congress that they were legal. If any of KPMG's partners or employees acted under a similar belief, they are not guilty of a criminal offense. In such a case, KPMG's conduct would appear to be ethically indefensible.
The principles of organizational justice instruct KPMG not to take adverse action against its employees in the absence of sufficient evidence of wrongdoing. Yet, by dismissing and failing to advance the attorney's fees of employees who elect to defend themselves, publicly stating that such employees are guilty of fraud, informing the government of the documents such employees need for their defense, and otherwise refusing to aid in their employees' defense, KPMG has done precisely that.
In soliciting information from its tax partners and employees to prepare its defense before Congress, KPMG promised them the confidentiality inherent in the attorney-client privilege. By waiving the attorney-client privilege and disclosing all potentially incriminating statements made by its partners and employees to the government, KPMG breached this promise in a way that is highly detrimental to those who relied upon it.
To function ethically in the future, KPMG needs employees who are willing to come forward with information of unethical or illegal conduct within the firm. By demonstrating that it will sacrifice the interests of partners and employees who may be innocent of wrongdoing in order to help the government prosecute those suspected of illegal activity, KPMG has made it significantly less likely that its employees will bring questionable conduct to management's attention.
Adding a legal dimension to the analysis helps explain what from the traditional perspective must seem to be incomprehensible behavior. As a matter of law, KPMG is guilty of tax fraud if any of its partners or employees participated in the sale of the shelters with the belief that they were illegal or if the pooled knowledge of all of its employees is sufficient to justify such
As previously noted, this requires the corporation to be willing to plead guilty, which in turn requires it 85 to regard its employees as guilty. See supra note 73. Hence, the corporation must make no public statements inconsistent with this assumption. client privilege and disclose all potentially incriminating information to the government, refuse to help suspected employees mount a legal defense, and otherwise do everything in its power to ensure the cooperation of its employees, including sanctioning any who refuse to cooperate.
Hence, KPMG's behavior can be seen as an effort to protect the firm's employees, investors, and other stakeholders from the fate suffered by Arthur Andersen's stakeholders.
The decision KPMG's management faced was a difficult one. The demands of the law and law enforcement policy confronted it with the strongest possible incentives to act as it did. KPMG had to balance these legal demands against conflicting ethical demands to abide by the principles organizational justice, honor promises of confidentiality, and maintain a working environment in which employees are willing to come forward with their ethical concerns. Precisely how to strike this balance may have no obvious answer, but it is clearly an important question to ask. Adding a legal dimension to our ethical analysis will not in itself answer this question, but, unlike the traditional approach to business ethics, it will ensure that the question is asked.
IX. Conclusion
In Flatland, A Square attempts to bring the knowledge of the third dimension to his world knowing that his message would be poorly received by the intelligentsia whose status and position were derived from their superior ability to discern figures in two dimensions. Despite his trepidation, he was unable to restrain himself from proclaiming the truth that had been revealed to him. And indeed, his reward for trying to enlighten his brethren was to be condemned to perpetual isolation from the rest of society.
Similarly to A Square, I am attempting to bring the knowledge of the legal dimension to the world of business ethics knowing that my message may be poorly received by many ethicists whose professional standing derives from their superior ability to discern the relationships between the strategic and ethical dimensions of business. Incorporating a legal dimension into ethical analysis must prove discomforting to those who, although excellent philosophers or social scientists, have little legal expertise. Doing so will certainly add to their work load by requiring them to amass the necessary legal knowledge, and may require some of them to re-evaluate positions that they may have spent much of their professional lives developing. Despite this, I find that, like A Square, I am unable to restrain myself from proclaiming the truth as I have come to understand it, and hence, I have written this article. All that remains is for me to learn whether by doing so I have earned a fate similar to his.
